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Abstract
We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue raised from tolls set on the arcs of
a transportation network, under the constraint that users are assigned to toll-compatible
shortest paths. We first prove that this problem is strongly NP-hard. We then provide a
polynomial time algorithm with a worst-case precision guarantee of 12 log2mT +1, where
mT denotes the number of toll arcs. Finally we show that the approximation is tight
∗This work was done while the first author was at E´cole Polytechnique, Montre´al.
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with respect to a natural relaxation by constructing a family of instances for which the
relaxation gap is reached.
Keywords: network pricing, approximation algorithms, Stackelberg games, combi-
natorial optimization, NP-hard problems.
1 Introduction
This paper focuses on a class of bilevel problems that arise naturally when tariffs, tolls, or
devious taxes are to be determined over a network. This class of problems encompasses
several important optimization problems encountered in the transportation, telecommu-
nication, and airline industries. Our aim is twofold: first, we show that the problem is
NP-hard; then we present a polynomial time algorithm with a tight worst-case guarantee
of performance.
Bilevel programming is a modelling framework for situations where one player (the
“leader”) integrates within its optimization schedule the reaction of a second player
(the “follower”) to its own course of action. These problems are closely related to
static Stackelberg games and mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (or
MPECs, see Luo, Pang and Ralph [12]), in which the lower level solution characterizes
the equilibrium state of a physical or social system. Bilevel programs allow the modelling
of a variety of situations that occur in operations research, economics, finance, etc. For
instance, one may consider the maximization of social welfare, taking into account the
selfish behavior of consumers. It is well-known that the taxation of resources and services
at marginal cost (Pigovian taxes, see Pigou [15]) maximizes global welfare. However,
when some resources fall outside the control of the leader, the social optimum might not
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be reachable, yielding a “second-best” problem of true Stackelberg nature (see Verhoef,
Nijkamp and Rietveld [19], Hearn and Ramana [5], and Larsson and Patriksson [9] for
traffic examples). In constrast with these studies, we adopt the point of view of a firm
involved in the management of the network but oblivious to social welfare; the firm’s
only goal is to maximize its own revenue.
Bilevel programs are generally nonconvex and nondifferentiable, i.e., to all practi-
cal extent, intractable. In particular, it has been shown by Jeroslow [7] that linear
bilevel programming is NP-hard. This result has been refined by Vicente, Savard and
Ju´dice [20], who proved that obtaining a mere certificate of local optimality is strongly
NP-hard. Actually, Audet et al. [1] unveiled the close relationship between bilevel pro-
gramming and integer programming. This “intractability” has prompted the develop-
ment of heuristics that are adapted to the specific nature of the instance under con-
sideration, together with their worst-case analysis. Such analysis was first performed
for a network design problem with user-optimized flows by Marcotte [13], who proved
worst-case bounds for convex optimization based heuristics. More recently, worst-case
analysis of Stackelberg problems has been applied to job scheduling and to network
design by Roughgarden [16, 17], to network routing by Korilis, Lazar and Orda [8] and
to pricing of computer networks by Cocchi et al. [3]. All these works focus on “soft”
Stackelberg games, where the objectives of both players are non-conflicting, and where
heuristics are expected to perform well in practice, although their worst-case behavior
may turn out to be bad.
In this paper, we analyze an approximation algorithm for the toll optimization
problem (MaxToll in the sequel) formulated and analyzed by Labbe´, Marcotte and
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Savard [10]. In this game, which is almost zero-sum, a leader sets tolls on a subset
of arcs of a transportation network, while network users travel on shortest paths with
respect to the cost structure induced by the tolls. Labbe´ et al. [10] proved that the
Hamiltonian path problem can be reduced to a version of MaxToll involving negative
arc costs and positive lower bounds on tolls1. In this paper, we improve this result by
showing that MaxToll, without lower bound constraints on tolls, is strongly NP-hard.
Next, in the single-commodity case, we provide a polynomial time algorithm with a per-
formance guarantee of 12 log2mT + 1, where mT denotes the number of toll arcs in the
network. We then use this result as well as specially constructed instances to prove the
tightness of our analysis, as well as the optimality of the approximation factor obtained
with respect to a natural upper bound.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state the problem and
prove that it is NP-hard. In Section 3 we introduce an approximation algorithm whose
performance is analyzed in Section 4.
2 The model and its complexity
2.1 The model
The generic bilevel toll problem can be expressed as
max
T
Tx
1It was also shown recently by Marcotte et al.[14] that the TSP is a special case of MaxToll.
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where x is the partial solution of the parametric linear program
min
x,y
(c1 +T)x+ c2y
s.t. A1x+A2y = b
x,y ≥ 0,
In the above, T represents a toll vector, x the vector of toll commodities and y the
vector of toll-free commodities.
We shall consider a combinatorial version of this problem. Let G = (V,A) be a
directed multigraph with two distinguished vertices: the origin s ∈ V and the destination
t ∈ V . The arc set A is partitioned into subsets AT and AU of toll and toll-free arcs, of
respective cardinalities mT and mU . Arcs are assigned fixed costs c : AT → N
mT and
d : AU → N
mU (in the sequel, N = {0, 1, . . .}). Once tolls are added to the fixed costs
of AT , we obtain a toll network NT = (G, c+ T, d, s, t). Denoting by SP[NT ] the set
of shortest paths from s to t, we can then formulate MaxToll as the combinatorial
mathematical program (see also Figure 1):
max
T≥0
P∈SP[NT ]
∑
e∈AT∩P
T (e). (1)
This is a single-commodity instance of the toll setting problem analyzed by Labbe´ et
al. [10].
In this framework, the leader must strike the right balance between low toll levels,
which generate low revenue, and high levels, which could also result in low revenue,
as the follower would select a path with few toll arcs, or even none. An instance of
MaxToll is illustrated in Figure 2.
Several remarks are in order. Firstly, to avoid a trivial situation, we posit the
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INSTANCE: – a directed graph G = (V, AT ∪AU )
– fixed cost vectors c : AT → N
mT and d : AU → N
mU
– distinguished vertices s, t ∈ V such that there
exists a simple path from s to t in (V, AU)
SOLUTION: – a nonnegative toll vector T on AT
– a simple s− t path P of minimal length w.r.t.
the cost structure (c+ T, d)
MEASURE: – maximize
∑
e∈AT∩P
T (e)
Figure 1: MaxToll
existence of at least one toll-free path from s to t. Secondly, our formulation implies
that, given ties at the lower level (the user’s level), the leader chooses among the toll-
compatible shortest paths the one travelled by the follower. Note that a risk-averse
leader could always force the use of the most profitable path by subtracting a small
amount from every toll on that path, thus yielding a revenue as close as desired to
the revenue generated by the “cooperative” solution. Thirdly, once a path P has been
selected by the leader, toll arcs outside P become irrelevant. In practice, the removal
of these arcs can be achieved by setting tolls to an arbitrarily large value on toll arcs
outside P . We denote by NT (P ) the network where these arcs have been removed.
Finally, our central results hold also in a version of MaxToll where T is unconstrained;
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Figure 2: This network contains two toll arcs (represented by dashed
arcs). Fixed costs are given by numbers close to each arc. The optimal
path is (s, v2, v3, v4, t) with a revenue of 4 when T1 = 2 and T2 = 2.
in this case, negative tolls can be interpreted as subsidies. Actually, Labbe´, Marcotte
and Savard [11] have constructed instances where the optimal solution involves negative
tolls. Nevertheless, throughout most of the paper we focus on nonnegative tolls because
(i) this case is interesting in its own sake, (ii) intermediate results are easier to interpret
when tolls are thought to be nonnegative.
A natural upper bound on the leader’s revenue has been derived by Labbe´ et al. [10]
using duality arguments from linear programming theory. It also follows from Theorem 4
of Section 3.1. Let L∞ be the length of a shortest toll-free path and let L(P ) be the
length of a given path P with T (e) ≡ 0 for all toll arcs e.
Theorem 1 Let P be a path. Then the optimal revenue associated with P is bounded
above by
B(P ) ≡ L∞ − L(P ). (2)
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Since L∞ does not depend on P , it follows that the largest upper bound corresponds to
the path with smallest value of L(P ); that is, P is a shortest path when tolls are set to
0. We denote the length of such a path by L0 and by
LP = L∞ − L0 (3)
the value of a path-independent upper bound. This bound is simply the difference
between the costs of shortest paths corresponding to infinite and null tolls, respectively.
Note that, if the set of toll arcs is a singleton, the upper bound can always be achieved.
2.2 NP-hardness of MaxToll
The purpose of this section is to show that MaxToll is strongly NP-hard. We also
prove that a version of MaxToll where the toll vector is unconstrained shares this
property, thus settling a conjecture of Labbe´ et al. [10] about the complexity status of
the generic toll setting problem.
Theorem 2 MaxToll is strongly NP-hard.
Proof: Let C denote the sum of all fixed costs. It is not difficult to show that there
exists an optimal toll vector T that is integer-valued and less than C + 1; in particular,
optimal solutions are of polynomial size.
Now, consider a reduction from 3-SAT to MaxToll (see [4]). Let x1, . . . , xn be n
Boolean variables and
F =
m∧
i=1
(li1 ∨ li2 ∨ li3) (4)
be a 3-CNF formula consisting of m clauses with literals (variables or their negations)
lij . For each clause, we construct a sub-network comprising one toll arc for each literal
8
1 0 + Ti1 0 + Ti2 0 + Ti3
0 0
0
0 0
0
Figure 3: Sub-network for clause (li1 ∨ li2 ∨ li3).
as shown in Figure 3.
The idea is the following: if the optimal path goes through toll arc Tij , then the
corresponding literal lij is true (note: if lij = xk, then xk =false). The sub-networks
are connected by two arcs, a toll-free arc of cost 2 and a toll arc of cost 0, as shown in
Figure 4.
If F is satisfiable, we want the optimal path to go through a single toll arc per
sub-network (i.e., one true literal per clause) and simultaneously want to make sure
that the corresponding assignment of variables is consistent; i.e., paths that include a
variable and its negation must be ruled out. For that purpose, we assign to every pair of
literals corresponding to a variable and its negation an inter-clause toll-free arc between
the corresponding toll arcs (see Figure 4). As we will see, this implies that inconsistent
paths, involving a variable and its negation, are suboptimal.
Since the length of a shortest toll-free path is m+ 2(m− 1) = 3m− 2 and that of a
shortest path with zero tolls is 0, 3m− 2 is an upper bound on the revenue. We claim
that F is satisfiable if and only if the optimal revenue is equal to that bound.
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1 0 + T21 0 + T22 0 + T23
0
0
0
00
0
1 0 + T31 0 + T32 0 + T33
0
0 0 0
0
0
1 0 + T11 0 + T12 0 + T13
0 0
0
0 0
0
0 + T12
2 0 + T2
s
t
1
1
1
1
1
Figure 4: Network for the formula (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4) ∧ (x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x4).
Inter-clause arcs are bold. Path through T12, T22, T32 is optimal (x2 = x3 =true).
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Assume that the optimal revenue is equal to 3m − 2. Obviously, the length of the
optimal path when tolls are set to 0 must be 0, otherwise the upper bound cannot be
reached. To achieve this, the optimal path has to go through one toll arc per sub-network
(it cannot use inter-clause arcs) and tolls have to be set to 1 on selected literals, C+1 on
other literals and 2 on tolls Tk, ∀ k. We claim that the optimal path does not include a
variable and its negation. Indeed, if that were the case, the inter-clause arc joining the
corresponding toll arcs would impose a constraint on the tolls between its endpoints.
In particular, the toll Tk immediately following the initial vertex of this inter-clause arc
would have to be set at most to 1, instead of 2. This yields a contradiction. Therefore,
the optimal path must correspond to a consistent assignment, and F is satisfiable (note:
if a variable and its negation do not appear on the optimal path, this variable can be
set to any value).
Conversely if F is satisfiable, at least one literal per clause is true in a satisfying
assignment. Consider the path going through the toll arcs corresponding to these literals.
Since the assignment is consistent, the path does not simultaneously include a variable
and its negation, and no inter-clause arc limits the revenue. Thus, the upper bound of
3m− 2 is reached on this path.
Finally, note that the number of arcs in the reduction is less than
10m+ 2(m− 1) + (3m)2
and that all constants are polynomially bounded in m.

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It is not difficult to prove that the same NP-hardness reduction works when negative
tolls are allowed.
Theorem 3 MaxToll is still strongly NP-hard when negative tolls are allowed.
Proof: We use the same reduction as in the nonnegative case. The proof rests on
two results proved in [10]. First, the upper bound is valid when T is unrestricted.
Second, there exists optimal solutions of polynomial size. The latter result follows from
a polyhedral characterization of the feasible set.
From the first result, we know that the 3m − 2 upper bound on the revenue is
unchanged. On the other hand, if F is satisfiable, the feasible solution considered in the
nonnegative case still yields a 3m− 2 revenue. We only have to make sure that negative
tolls cannot produce a 3m − 2 revenue when F is not satisfiable. Again, to reach the
upper bound, one has to use a path of length 0 when tolls are set to 0. Consequently the
optimal path comprises exactly one literal per clause. Now the toll-free arcs of length 1
and 2 limit the Tij ’s on the path to 1 and the Tk’s to 2, so negative tolls are useless in
this case. Indeed, inconsistent paths will see their revenue limited by inter-clause arcs
without any possibility to make up for the loss incurred from negative tolls.

3 Approximation algorithm
In this section, we devise a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for MaxToll.
Such an algorithm is guaranteed to compute a feasible solution with objective at least
OPT/α, where OPT is the optimal revenue and α, which depends on the number
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mT of toll arcs, denotes the approximation factor. For a survey of recent results on
approximation algorithms, the reader is referred to Hochbaum [6], Vazirani [18] and
Ausiello et al. [2].
3.1 Preliminaries: characterizing consistent tolls
The leader is only interested in paths that have the potential of generating positive
revenue. This remark warrants the following definitions. Recall that NT (P ) is the
network NT in which toll arcs outside the path P have been removed.
Definition 1 Let mPT denote the number of toll arcs in a path P from s to t . We say
that P is valid if mPT ≥ 1 and P is a shortest path with respect to a null toll vector T ,
i.e., P ∈ SP [N0(P )].
It is clear that non-valid paths cannot generate revenue. Any valid path P can be
expressed as a sequence
P =
(
υ0,1, τ1, υ1,2, τ2, . . . , τmP
T
, υmP
T
,mP
T
+1
)
(5)
where τi is the i-th toll arc of P (in the order of traversal) and υi,i+1 is the toll-free
subpath of P from the terminal vertex term(τi) of τi to the initial vertex init(τi+1)
of τi+1. According to this notation, υ0,1 starts in s and υmP
T
,mP
T
+1 ends in t. Since
P ∈ SP [N0(P )], υi,i+1 is a shortest toll-free path from term(τi) to init(τi+1). We
extend this notation to υi,j, a shortest toll-free path from term(τi) to init(τj), with
length Ui,j. For k < l, let Lk,l be the length of P (i.e. the sum of costs) from term(τk)
to init(τl) with tolls set to 0, and Tk,l be the sum of tolls between term(τk) and init(τl)
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on P ,
Lk,l =
l−1∑
i=k
Ui,i+1 +
l−1∑
i=k+1
c(τi) Tk,l =
l−1∑
i=k+1
T (τi), (6)
with the convention that
∑l
i=k xi = 0 if l < k.
Definition 2 Let P be a valid path. The toll vector T is consistent with P if P ∈
SP [NT (P )]; that is, P remains a shortest path when tolls outside P are removed and
tolls on P are set according to the vector T .
The following result, which characterizes consistent tolls, is the starting point of our
algorithm.
Theorem 4 Let P be a valid path. Then, the toll vector T is consistent with P if and
only if
Li,j + Ti,j ≤ Ui,j ∀ 0 ≤ i < j ≤ m
P
T + 1. (7)
Before providing the proof of this theorem, we give an example of its application. Con-
sider again the network of Figure 2. Take the path P = (s, v2, v3, v4, t). Using the
renumbering system introduced above, we have that τ1 = (s, v2), τ2 = (v4, t), v0,1 is
empty (it actually consists in the node s by itself), v1,2 = (v2, v3, v4) and v2,3 is also
empty. Other toll-free subpaths that play a role in Theorem 4 are v0,2 = (s, v1, v4),
v1,3 = (v2, v3, v5, t), and v0,3 = (s, v6, t). The corresponding lengths are U0,1 = U1,2 =
U2,3 = 0, U0,2 = 11, U1,3 = 7, and U0,3 = 4. Thus, the inequalities in Theorem 4 are
T (τ1) ≤ 11, T (τ2) ≤ 7, T (τ1) + T (τ2) ≤ 4.
From this we conclude that one possible set of optimal taxes is T (τ1) = T (τ2) = 2 as
claimed in Figure 2. Figure 5 provides an equivalent representation of this example
according to Theorem 4.
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s7
4
11
0 + T1
0 + T2
t
0
0
0
Figure 5: Equivalent representation of the example of Figure 2. All
arcs have been replaced by shortest paths between toll arcs and ori-
gin/destination.
Proof of Theorem 4: =⇒) Obvious from the very definition of consistent tolls. ⇐=)
We need to check that the length of P remains smaller than or equal to the length of
any other path when tolls satisfy (7). This looks rather obvious. However, one must be
careful about paths that borrow a subset of the toll arcs of P , possibly in a different
sequence (note that toll-free paths are taken care of by setting i = 0 and j = mPT + 1
above). Assume, by contradiction, that such a path P˜ is strictly shorter than P in
NT (P ), and that conditions (7) are satisfied. We note
P˜ =
(
υ˜0,1, τ˜1, υ˜1,2, . . . , τ˜mP˜
T
, υ˜
mP˜
T
,mP˜
T
+1
)
(8)
with corresponding U˜i,j, L˜k,l and T˜k,l for all i, j, k, l with k < l. For all i, τ˜i = τδ(i) for
some injective function δ (toll arcs outside P are irrelevant). To derive a contradiction,
we will construct a path that is shorter than P˜ by modifying the “backward” toll-free
subpaths of P˜ . This improved path will happen to be P . See Figure 6 for an illustration.
15
P˜τ˜3 = τδ(j2)
υ˜3,4
τ˜1 = τδ(j1)τ˜2
υ˜2,3υ˜0,1
υ˜1,2
P
Figure 6: The thick path is P˜ while the straight thin path is P . An
example of the “backward” toll-free subpaths referred to in the proof is
v˜1,2 → τ˜2 → v˜2,3. This gets replaced by the section of P between τδ(j1)
and τδ(j2), which is clearly shorter.
Let j1 = 1 and jk = min{j > jk−1 : δ(j) > δ(jk−1)}, as long as such jk exists, the last
one being denoted jK . We further define δ(0) = j0 = 0 and δ(m
P˜
T +1) = jK+1 = m
P˜
T +1.
We claim that
Lδ(jk−1),δ(jk) + Tδ(jk−1),δ(jk) ≤ L˜jk−1,jk + T˜jk−1,jk ,
for all k. This implies that we can replace the subpath of P˜ between term(τ˜jk−1)
and init(τ˜jk), by the subpath of P between term(τδ(jk−1)) and init(τδ(jk)) without
increasing its length. But after doing this for all k, we obtain P which is a contradiction.
We divide the claim above in two cases. Firstly, if jk − 1 = jk−1 (i.e. P˜ “goes in the
direction of P”, e.g. v˜0,1 in Figure 6), then
L˜jk−1,jk + T˜jk−1,jk = Uδ(jk−1),δ(jk) ≥ Lδ(jk−1),δ(jk) + Tδ(jk−1),δ(jk),
where we have used (7) (note that in this case, there are no toll arcs on P˜ between
term(τ˜jk−1) and init(τ˜jk)). Otherwise, jk − 1 6= jk−1 (i.e. P˜ “goes in the direction
opposite to P”, e.g. v˜1,2 → τ˜2 → v˜2,3 in Figure 6). By definition of jk, we have
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δ(jk−1) ≤ δ(jk−1) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K+1. For example, in Figure 6, we have τδ(j2−1) = τ˜2
which clearly comes before τδ(j2) = τ˜3 on P . From this and (7), we get
L˜jk−1,jk + T˜jk−1,jk = L˜jk−1,jk−1 + T˜jk−1,jk−1 + c(τδ(jk−1)) + T (τδ(jk−1)) + Uδ(jk−1),δ(jk)
≥ Uδ(jk−1),δ(jk) ≥ Lδ(jk−1),δ(jk) + Tδ(jk−1),δ(jk)
≥ Lδ(jk−1),δ(jk) + Tδ(jk−1),δ(jk).

Remark. There always exists an optimal solution with tolls less than C + 1 (see
Theorem 2 for a definition of C). Indeed, Ui,j < C + 1, ∀ i, j implies that optimal tolls
on P have to be lower than C + 1. Therefore, fixing tolls to C + 1 outside P generates
no additional active constraints on the tolls of P .
3.2 High-level description of the algorithm
ExploreDescendants is an approximation algorithm motivated by the previous char-
acterization of consistent tolls. Initially, the algorithm computes the optimal revenue
associated with a shortest path in SP[N0], i.e, a path with the largest upper bound
B(P )2. If revenue is smaller than the upper bound LP , Theorem 4 implies that there
exists a toll-free subpath υk,l k < l whose short length forces some tolls in P to be small.
To relax this constraint, it makes sense to skip the subpath of P between term(τk) and
init(τl) and to replace it by υk,l. This yields a new path whose length will not be much
larger than the length of P , and for which some constraints (7) have been removed.
This path is a natural candidate for improved revenue. By repeating this process, we
2As shown in the next section, this can be achieved in polynomial time.
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will show that Algorithm ExploreDescendants can uncover, in polynomial time, a
path with good approximation properties.
Algorithm ExploreDescendants is streamlined in Figure 7. It comprises two
subroutines, MaxRev and TollPartition. MaxRev computes the largest revenue
compatible with the shortest path status of P . Starting from P , TollPartition gen-
erates two descendants of path P . The algorithm is initialized with P0 in N0, a shortest
path of length L0.
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Algorithm ExploreDescendants
Input: a path P
Output: a path P , tolls T and objective value V
• Compute maximum revenue VP achievable on P and corresponding toll vector
TP :
(
VP , TP , {(i′(k), j′(k))}
mP
T
k=1
)
:= MaxRev(P )
• If VP < B(P ) then
– Derive new paths from P :
(P1, P2) := TollPartition
(
P, {(i′(k), j′(k))}
mP
T
k=1
)
– For i = 1, 2 : (V i, T i, P i) := ExploreDescendants(Pi)
– Return V := max{VP , V 1, V 2} and corresponding toll vector T and path
P
• Else return (V , T , P ) := (VP , TP , P )
Figure 7: Algorithm ExploreDescendants
19
3.3 Maximizing path-compatible revenue
Let P be a valid path in N denoted by
P =
(
υ0,1, τ1, υ1,2, . . . , τmP
T
, υmP
T
,mP
T
+1
)
(9)
with corresponding values of Ui,j, Lk,l and Tk,l for all i, j, k, l, with k < l. The optimal
tolls compatible with P ’s shortest path status can be obtained from a simple greedy
algorithm (see Figure 8): consider each toll arc in order of traversal, and fix its value
to the largest value allowed by Theorem 4, taking into account the tolls previously set.
This leads to the recursion
T (τk) := tk ≡ min
0≤i<k<j≤mP
T
+1
{
Ui,j − Li,j −
k−1∑
l=i+1
tl
}
. (10)
The validity of the above formula rests on Theorem 5 where we construct a sequence of
toll-free subpaths such that (i) every toll of P is bounded from above by at least one
path in the sequence (condition (13) below), (ii) the sum of the tolls defined by (10) is
equal to the sum of the bounds imposed by the paths of the sequence (condition (14)
below).
Labbe´ et al. [10] give another polynomial time algorithm for this task but it does
not provide the information we need regarding the active toll-free subpaths. This in-
formation will be instrumental in generating new paths from P and in obtaining an
approximation guarantee.
Theorem 5 Let υi,j, 0 ≤ i < j ≤ m
P
T +1, be the toll-free subpaths defined in Section 3.1
and let tk, 1 ≤ k ≤ m
P
T be as in (10). Then, there exists a sequence of paths
υi(1), j(1), υi(2), j(2), . . . , υi(q), j(q) (11)
Algorithm MaxRev
Input: a path P
Output: tolls TP , objective value VP , and sequence of indices {(i′(k), j′(k))}
mP
T
k=1
• Denote P =
(
υ0,1, τ1, υ1,2, τ2, . . . , τmP
T
, υmP
T
,mP
T
+1
)
, and set k := 1
• While k < mPT + 1, do
– Compute
TP (τk) := tk ≡ min
0≤i<k<j≤mP
T
+1
{
Ui,j −Li,j −
k−1∑
l=i+1
tl
}
– Let (i′(k), j′(k)) be the pair of indices for which the minimum above is
attained, breaking ties by selecting the largest j′(k) and corresponding
smallest i′(k)
– Set (i′(l), j′(l)) := (i′(k), j′(k)) for all k < l < j′(k)
– Set k := j′(k)
• Let TP be +∞ outside P and VP :=
∑mPT
k=1 tk
• Return TP , VP and {(i′(k), j′(k))}
mPT
k=1
Figure 8: Algorithm MaxRev
with i(1) = 0 and j(q) = mPT + 1 such that for all h (see Figure 9)
i(h+ 1) < j(h) ≤ i(h+ 2) < j(h + 1) (12)
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and for all k
|{h : i(h) + 1 ≤ k ≤ j(h) − 1}| ≥ 1 (13)
with equality if tk 6= 0. This implies that for all h
′, h′′ with h′ ≤ h′′
j(h′′)−1∑
k=i(h′)+1
tk =
h′′∑
h=h′
[
Ui(h),j(h) − Li(h),j(h)
]
. (14)
Corollary 1 The toll assignment defined by (10) is optimal for P .
Proof of Corollary 1: For every toll assignment T ′ consistent with P
mPT∑
k=1
T ′(τk) ≤
q∑
h=1
[
Ui(h),j(h) − Li(h),j(h)
]
, by (7) and (13)
=
mP
T∑
k=1
tk, by (14).

Proof of Theorem 5: This proof is rather cumbersome, so we start by giving an intuitive
description. By Theorem 4, we know that tolls are constrained by toll-free subpaths. In
order to obtain the corollary above – which is the ultimate purpose of this theorem –
we need to find a subset of constraints such that each toll arc is covered by at least one
constraint and such that the sum of the slacks of the constraints is the same as the sum of
υi(h+1),j(h+1)
τi(h+1) τj(h) τi(h+2) τj(h+1)
· · ·· · ·
υi(h),j(h) υi(h+2),j(h+2)
P
Figure 9: A section of a path P , showing toll arcs τk with k = i(h +
1), j(h), i(h + 2), j(h+ 1).
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the tk’s. Natural candidates for saturated constraints are derived from (10): when we fix
tk, at least one constraint becomes saturated. These constraints will be denoted by the
sequence of indices {(i′(k), j′(k))}
mP
T
k=1 below. The problem with them is that they might
be redundant. For example, in setting t1 we might saturate the path v0,3 and then in
setting t3 we might saturate the path v0,5 which “supersedes” v0,3. This situation makes
it impossible to obtain equality in (14). To remove redundant constraints, a natural
strategy is to first compute the sequence {(i′(k), j′(k))}
mPT
k=1, then to start from t1 and
choose among all constraints in this subset the one that “goes furthest” (say v0,5 above).
Then go to t5 and do the same; and so on. This allows to skip the redundant constraints.
Still, this is not quite what we want because there might be nonzero tk’s in the “overlaps”
of the chosen constraints (in Figure 9, this would correspond to nonzero tk’s between
τi(h+1) and τj(h)), which again would give strict inequality in (14). It turns out that
using the above strategy but starting from the end gives the desired properties. The
result of this will be denoted by {(i(k), j(k))}qk=1 below. To see why this works, consider
Figure 9. Say that at some point in our choice of saturated constraints we get to toll
arc τi(h+2). We then choose the constraint covering τi(h+2) (among {(i
′(k), j′(k))}
mP
T
k=1)
which reaches furthest in the direction of s, here denoted vi(h+1),j(h+1). All arcs between
τi(h+2) and τi(h+1) are now covered (some of those are not represented in Figure 9), so
we go to τi(h+1). Likewise, we choose the path vi(h),j(h). Now note that when we set
ti(h+1) in the recursion (10), the constraint corresponding to vi(h),j(h) became saturated
(or it had been saturated by a previous toll), so that all toll arcs between τi(h+1) and
τj(h) (not represented here) have been set to 0, as claimed. The heart of the proof that
follows is to check that this is indeed the case.
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Consider the following construction. Start with k = 1. In the recursive formula (10),
let (i′(k), j′(k)) denote the index for which the minimum is attained when setting tk.
This makes sense because we assumed that there exists a toll-free path from s to t. In
case of nonuniqueness, select the largest index j and the corresponding smallest index
i. Note that there holds
tl = 0, ∀ k + 1 ≤ l ≤ j
′(k)− 1. (15)
Then rather than evaluating (10) for tk+1, we jump from tk to tj′(k) and set
(i′(l), j′(l)) = (i′(k), j′(k)), ∀ k + 1 ≤ l ≤ j′(k)− 1. (16)
Recursing gives a sequence of indices {(i′(k), j′(k))}
mPT
k=1.
In view of Theorem 4, which implies that
j(h)−1∑
k=i(h)+1
T (τk) ≤ Ui(h),j(h) − Li(h),j(h), (17)
we say that υi(h),j(h) covers the toll arcs τk for i(h) + 1 ≤ k ≤ j(h) − 1. To derive (14),
we look for a subset of {υi′(k),j′(k)}
mPT
k=1 that covers all toll arcs of P and such that tk = 0
for all arcs τk covered by more than one subpath.
We proceed backwards. Select l1 = m
P
T and recursively compute lk = i
′(lk−1) until
lq+1 = 0 for some index q. There follows:
j′(l1) = m
P
T + 1 and i
′(lq) = 0. (18)
Now, reverse the sequence by setting (i(k), j(k)) = (i′(lq+1−k), j
′(lq+1−k)), 1 ≤ k ≤ q,
to obtain a sequence that satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 4:
1. i(1) = 0, j(q) = mPT + 1: This follows from (18).
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2. i(h) < i(h + 1): This follows from the construction of the backwards sequence
{li}
q
i=1.
3. i(h + 1) < j(h): By contradiction, assume that j(h) ≤ i(h + 1). This implies
that τj(h) is not covered by a toll-free subpath. This is impossible by the very
construction of {(i(k), j(k))}qk=1 .
4. j(h) ≤ i(h+ 2): By contradiction, assume that j(h) > i(h+ 2). Then
(i′(lq+1−h), j
′(lq+1−h)) = (i(h), j(h)) implies that i
′(l) = i(h) for all indices lq+1−h <
l < j′(lq+1−h) = j(h) and in particular for index l = lq+1−h−1 = i
′(lq+1−h−2) =
i(h + 2) (< j(h) by assumption). This implies the contradiction i′(lq+1−h−1) =
i(h+ 1) = i(h).
5. (13) and (14): By construction, every arc is covered by at least one path. By the
preceding inequalities, the only arcs covered by more than one path must belong
to the interval k = i(h+1)+ 1, . . . , j(h)− 1, for some index h. By (15), their tolls
must be zero, and (13) is satisfied; (14) then follows from (13).

3.4 Partitioning the set of toll arcs
The approximation algorithm progressively removes toll arcs from the network. It makes
use of the following definition.
Definition 3 A descendant P ′ of a valid path P ∈ N0 is a simple path from s to t in
N0(P ) that traverses a subset of the toll arcs of P in the same order as does P .
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Let P be a valid path in N0. Theorem 5 suggests a way of constructing a descendant
of P that stands a chance of achieving a high revenue, whenever P ’s revenue is low. Let
us consider the set
υi(1), j(1), υi(2), j(2), . . . , υi(q), j(q) (19)
of toll-free paths such that
0 = i(1) < i(2) < j(1) ≤ i(3) < j(2) ≤ i(4) < j(3) ≤ · · · ≤ i(q) < j(q−1) < j(q) = mPT+1
(20)
and equality (14) holds. If the maximum revenue on P is B(P ) then descendants need
not be considered, because their upper bounds are smaller than or equal to B(P ). This
happens in particular if q = 1. We can therefore assume that q is larger than 1.
We now consider two descendants: P1 contains all υi(h),j(h) with h odd and is com-
posed of arcs of P between them; P2 is constructed in a similar manner, with even
values of the index h. For instance, P1 may start in s, borrow υi(1),j(1), take path P
between init(τj(1)) and term(τi(3)), bifurcate on υi(3),j(3), return to P , and so on. Such
a pattern, which is allowed by (20), is performed by procedure TollPartition (see
Figure 10). Note that P1 and P2 have no toll arcs in common and that some toll arcs
of P belong neither to P1 nor to P2. The rationale behind this construction is the rela-
tionship between the maximum revenue achievable on P and the upper bounds on the
tolls of P1 and P2 given by Theorem 5.
Both these descendants are valid paths. If this were not the case for P1, there would
exist a subpath υi(h),j(h′) (h < h
′ both odd) such that Ui(h),j(h′) is strictly smaller than
the length of P1 between term(τi(h)) and init(τj(h′)) (indeed, a path is valid if and only if
the null toll vector is consistent with it). Since this length is equal to Li(h),j(h′)+Ti(h),j(h′)
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by (14) we obtain that the toll assignment on P is not consistent, a contradiction. A
similar argument applies to P2.
Algorithm TollPartition
Input: a path P and sequence of indices {(i′(k), j′(k))}
mPT
k=1
Output: two paths P1, P2
• Set l := mPT , r := 1
• (Backwards selection of constraints) While l > 0, do
– Set (i′′(r), j′′(r)) := (i′(l), j′(l))
– Set l := i′(l), r := r + 1
• Let q be the last index in the loop above
• (Reversing the order of the sequence) For all 1 ≤ k ≤ q, set
(i(k), j(k)) := (i′′(q − k), j′′(q − k))
• (Constructing the descendants) Let P1 contain all υi(h),j(h) with h odd and
be composed of arcs of P between them; let P2 be constructed in a similar
manner, with even values of the index h
• Return P1, P2
Figure 10: Algorithm TollPartition
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0 + T3
0 + T4
0 + T1
1
3
s t
0 + T2
10
1
v3
v5
v6
v7 v8
v4
v2v1
Figure 11: An instance of MaxToll. Arcs without label have cost 0.
3.5 A detailed example
We apply the algorithm to the example of Figure 11. Here the shortest path is of length
0 and shortest toll-free path has length 10 so that LP = 10. We start with the shortest
path when tolls are set to 0
P0 = (s, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, t).
We apply MaxRev: T1 = T (τ1) = 1 because of (s, v3) (i.e. v0,2) so (i
′(1), j′(1)) = (0, 2);
T2 = T (τ2) = 2 because of (s, v7) (i.e. v0,4) so (i
′(2), j′(2)) = (0, 4); now we jump over τ3,
setting T3 = T (τ3) = 0 and (i
′(3), j′(3)) = (0, 4); finally T4 = T (τ4) = 1 because of (v4, t)
(i.e. v2,5) so (i
′(4), j′(4)) = (2, 5). The total profit is 4. We then run TollPartition.
We start from the end, i.e. τ4. We get (i
′′(1), j′′(1)) = (i(4), j(4)) = (2, 5). We jump over
to τ2. We set (i
′′(2), j′′(2)) = (i(2), j(2)) = (0, 4). And we are done. We finally obtain
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the sequence (i(1), j(1)) = (0, 4), (i(2), j(2)) = (2, 5) (note in passing that the only toll
arc in the “overlap” of (i(1), j(1)) and (i(2), j(2)), i.e. τ3, has been set to 0, as claimed by
Theorem 5). The new paths are thus P1 = (s, v7, v8, t) and P2 = (s, v1, v2, v3, v4, t).
Now consider P1. We fix T1 = T2 = T3 = +∞. The only constraint on T4 comes
from the arc (s, t). So we set T4 = 10 − 3 = 7. There are no descendants to this path.
Consider P2. Fix T3 = T4 = +∞. Apply MaxRev again. The toll T1 is bounded
by 1 because of (s, v3). Then T2 = 10 − 1 − 1 = 8. The total profit on P2 is 9. Again,
applying TollPartition, we get that there are no descendants (the descendant is
actually (s, t)).
Summing up, the best profit was achived on P2 with 9. Note that in this example,
the algorithm returns the optimal path, but this is not always the case.
4 Analysis of the algorithm
4.1 Approximation bound
We shall prove that ExploreDescendants is an 12 log2mT + 1-approximation algo-
rithm for MaxToll. The exact approximation factor is given by the recursion
α(k) =
1
2
max
i+j≤k
0<i≤j<k
{1 + α(i) + α(j)}, (21)
with α(1) = 1. It can be shown by induction that for all k,
α(k) ≤
1
2
log2 k + 1
Definition 4 The maximum revenue VP induced by path P is sufficient if
VP ≥
1
α(mPT )
B(P ). (22)
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Theorem 6 Let P be a valid path on N0. If the maximum revenue achievable on P is
not sufficient, then either path P1 or P2 (say P
′) returned by TollPartition satisfies
1
α(mP
′
T )
B(P ′) ≥
1
α(mPT )
B(P ) (23)
Proof: Let
P =
(
υ0,1, τ1, υ1,2, . . . , τmP
T
, υmP
T
,mP
T
+1
)
with corresponding values of Ui,j, Lk,l and Tk,l for all i, j, k, l, k < l. Similarly, for
r = 1, 2,
Pr =
(
υr0,1, τ
r
1 , υ
r
1,2, . . . , τ
r
mPr
T
, υr
mPr
T
,mPr
T
+1
)
with corresponding values of Uri,j, L
r
k,l and T
r
k,l for all i, j, k, l, k < l. Let
υi(1), j(1), υi(2), j(2), . . . , υi(q), j(q)
be the sequence of toll-free paths obtained from Theorem 5.
For all h > 1, one of the paths Pr contains υi(h−1),j(h−1), while the other contains
υi(h),j(h). Therefore, the subpath of P between term(τi(h)) and init(τj(h−1)) is in neither
P1 nor P2. The remaining arcs of P belong to either P1 or P2. This implies that
L1
0,m
P1
T
+1
+ L2
0,m
P2
T
+1
=
q∑
h=1
Ui(h),j(h) + L0,mP
T
+1 −
q∑
h=2
Li(h),j(h−1)
=
q∑
h=1
[
Ui(h),j(h) − Li(h),j(h)
]
+ 2L0,mP
T
+1
By Theorem 5, the first term on the right-hand side is equal to
∑mPT
k=1 tk and is strictly
smaller than B(P )/α(mPT ) by hypothesis. Multiplying by (−1) and adding 2U0,mPT +1
=
U
0,m
P1
T
+1
+ U
0,m
P2
T
+1
on both sides, we get
B(P1) +B(P2) >
(
2−
1
α
(
mPT
))B(P ).
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By definition of α:
α(mPT ) ≥
1
2
[
1 + α(mP1T ) + α(m
P2
T )
]
=⇒
(
2−
1
α
(
mPT
)) ≥ α(mP1T ) + α(mP2T )
α(mPT )
.
By substituting in the preceding inequality, we obtain
α(mP1T )
(
1
α(mP1T )
B(P1)
)
+α(mP2T )
(
1
α(mP2T )
B(P2)
)
≥ (α(mP1T )+α(m
P2
T ))
(
1
α(mPT )
B(P )
)
,
which yields the desired result. Indeed, if we had 1
α(mPr
T
)
B(Pr) <
1
α(mP
T
)
B(P ) for r = 1, 2,
this would imply the opposite inequality.

As a corollary, we obtain the main result of this section.
Corollary 2 Let APP denote the revenue obtained from the application of the procedure
ExploreDescendants to a path P0 of shortest length L0 in N0. Then,
APP ≥
1
α(mP0T )
LP ≥
1
α(mT )
OPT. (24)
Proof: Let P be a valid path and (V , T , P ) the output of ExploreDescendants(P ).
It is sufficient to show, by induction on mPT that
V ≥
1
α(mPT )
B(P ). (25)
This statement is true if mPT = 1 since the upper bound B(P ) is always achievable on
a path with a single toll arc. Now assume that the property holds when the number of
toll arcs is less than mPT > 1. Let (VP , TP ) := MaxRev(P ). If VP is sufficient, (25) is
satisfied. If VP is not sufficient then, by Theorem 6, TollPartition returns a path P
′
with 1
α(mP
′
T
)
B(P ′) ≥ 1
α(mP
T
)
B(P ). Since the number of toll arcs in P ′ is less than that
in P , property (25) is satisfied for P ′, and the preceding inequality implies that (25) is
satisfied for P as well.
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Note that this result applies to the case of negative tolls as well since the upper
bound (2) is the same. Indeed, ExploreDescendants allows only nonnegative tolls
but it computes a feasible solution with a revenue at least LP/α, where LP is unchanged
in the unbounded case.
4.2 Tightness of the approximation
The approximation algorithm determines, in a constructive manner, an upper bound
α(mT ) on the ratio OPT/LP . In this section, we show through a family of instances
that this bound is tight.
Theorem 7 Let I(mT ) denote the set of instances of MaxToll correponding to a
fixed number of toll arcs mT . Then for all mT ≥ 1, the relaxation gap on I(mT ) is
α(mT ), that is
α(mT ) = max
I∈I(mT )
{
LP [I]
OPT [I]
}
, (26)
where LP [I] and OPT [I] denote respectively the upper bound and optimal value for
instance I.
Proof: Let us consider a two-node and two-arc network Z(1), with origin s1 and destina-
tion t1. The first arc (a toll arc) has fixed cost 0 and the second arc (a toll-free arc) has
fixed cost 2. We recursively construct a network Z(k) made up of a copy of Z(⌈k/2⌉) and
a copy of Z(⌊k/2⌋) (if k is even, there are two copies of Z(k/2)), and two distinguished
nodes, the origin sk and the destination tk. These are linked by five toll-free arcs, as
illustrated in Figure 12. Strictly speaking, the vertices s⌈k/2⌉, t⌈k/2⌉, s⌊k/2⌋, t⌊k/2⌋ should
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be re-labeled, otherwise many vertices will share the same label even though we consider
them all distinct. The parameters ak and bk of Z(k) are set to
ak = 1 + α
(⌊k
2
⌋)
− α
(⌈k
2
⌉)
bk = 1− α
(⌊k
2
⌋)
+ α
(⌈k
2
⌉)
, (27)
with a1 = b1 = 1 and α is defined in (21). Note that ak, bk ≥ 0 because 0 ≤ α(⌈k/2⌉)−
α(⌊k/2⌋) ≤ 1.
It is not difficult to show, by induction, that
α(k) =
1
2
[
1 + α
(⌈k
2
⌉)
+ α
(⌊k
2
⌋)]
. (28)
Let LP (k) and OPT (k) denote, respectively, the relaxed and optimal revenue values
on Z(k). Let U(k) be the length of the shortest toll-free path from sk to tk in Z(k).
We claim that U(k) = 2α(k). Indeed, we have U(1) = 2α(1) = 2 and, assuming that
U(k′) = 2α(k′) for all k′ < k, it follows from (28) that:
U(k) = min
{
U
(⌊k
2
⌋)
+ bk, U
(⌈k
2
⌉)
+ ak, U
(⌈k
2
⌉)
+ U
(⌊k
2
⌋)}
= 2α(k). (29)
Clearly, OPT (1) = LP (1) = 2 and LP (1)/OPT (1) = α(1) = 1. For k > 1, the shortest
path in Z(k) with tolls set to 0 has length 0. This implies that LP (k) = U(k) = 2α(k).
To conclude, we need to show (by induction) that OPT (k) = 2. We consider two
cases. If the optimal path on Z(k) goes through the arc joining t⌊k/2⌋ and s⌈k/2⌉, then
OPT (k) ≤ 2 because ak + bk = 2. We actually know in that case that OPT (k) = 2
because, by induction, a profit of 2 is achievable inside each of Z(⌈k/2⌉) and Z(⌊k/2⌋)
separately and the only new constraints are those associated to ak and bk. Otherwise,
the optimal path belongs entirely to Z(⌊k/2⌋) or Z(⌈k/2⌉) in which case OPT (k) = 2
by the induction hypothesis. 3
3It is straightforward to check that the same argument works in the negative tolls case.
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2
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⌋
sk tk
2
s1 t1
0 + T
Figure 12: Networks Z(1), left, and Z(k), right. Toll arcs are dashed.

We have just proved the optimality of our approximation factor with respect to the
upper bound. We can prove more than that: the same family of instances, under a
slight modification, can be used to show that our analysis of ExploreDescendants
is tight. For this purpose, we require instances where APP is much smaller than OPT .
This is not the case in the examples of Figure 12 where, indeed, APP = OPT = 2.
However, our aim is attained if we add to Z(k) a toll arc of fixed cost 1 from sk to tk.
Then OPT = LP − 1 = 2α(k)− 1 (the optimal path being the new toll arc) yet APP is
still 2 since the algorithm starts with a path of length zero and misses the optimal path
of length 1.
4.3 Running time analysis
MaxToll is initialized with a shortest path P0, which can be computed in O(n
2) time.
The toll arcs of the descendants constitute a subset of the toll arcs in P0, and their
traversal order is the same. Therefore, the values Ui,j, i < j computed for P0 can
be reused for all descendants, under an appropriate renumbering. This operation is
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achieved in O(mP0T n
2) = O(mTn
2) time. The time required to evaluate Li,j, i < j, as
the algorithm proceeds, is much smaller.
Within ExploreDescendants, MaxRev requires at most O((mPT )
3) to compute
the maximal revenue induced by path P . Based on the indices {(i′(k), j′(k))}
mP
T
k=1 ob-
tained from MaxRev, TollPartition generates two descendants in O(mPT ) time. It
follows that the running time of ExploreDescendants on a path P is determined by
the recursion
T(mPT ) = T(m
P1
T ) + T(m
P2
T ) +O((m
P
T )
3) (30)
where mP1T + m
P2
T ≤ m
P
T . Therefore, the worst-case complexity, achieved when m
P1
T
is always equal to mPT − 1, is O((m
P
T )
4). The worst-case running-time of the entire
algorithm is O(mT (m
3
T + n
2)).
5 Concluding remarks
Our algorithm can also be applied to the multi-commodity extension of MaxToll con-
sidered in [10], where each commodity k ∈ K is associated with an origin-destination
pair. Given a demand matrix, users solve shortest path problems parameterized by the
toll vector T . If distinct tolls T k could be assigned to distinct commodities, the multi-
commodity extension would reduce to a |K|-fold version of the basic problem. Otherwise,
the interaction between commodity flows on the arcs of a common transportation net-
work complicates the problem, both from a theoretical and algorithmical point of view.
Of course, we can obtain an O(|K| logmT ) guarantee by applying MaxToll to each
commodity separately and then selecting, among the |K| commodity toll vectors, the
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one that generates the highest revenue. However bad this bound is, we conjecture that
it is tight with respect to the relaxation, which is the sum of the single-commodity
bounds, weighted by their respective demands. Indeed, we believe that the instances of
Figure 12 can be generalized to the multi-commodity case.
Other generalizations of MaxToll involve capacity constraints and lower bounds
on tolls. In the latter case, the relaxation gap becomes infinite for any value of mT ,
and our approach fails, as procedure ExploreDescendants becomes irrelevant. A
completely different line of attack is then required.
Finally, we raise the following important issue: Can our 12 log2mT + 1 guarantee be
improved? Such results would obviously require a tighter upper bound than the one
used in this paper.
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